CUBA IN THE MIDDLE
EAST
A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY
DOMINGO AMUCHASTEGUI
(1)
Foreword By
Haim Shaked, Director
Middle East Studies Institute
July, 1999
Contents:
INTRODUCTION
CHRONOLOGY
GLOSSARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTRODUCTION
After a close relationship with Middle Eastern groups and
countries for forty years, Cuba enjoys today an exceptional position in the
region with embassies in almost all countries, and with a wide variety of
political connections within the ruling elites. Castro is engaged in a
growing process of enlarging bilateral trade, financial assistance,
involvement in joint ventures, and cooperation projects, as well as in
diplomatic cooperation in the international system.
The context has changed over the years. While the priorities are not to
channel weapons to groups within the region, there are still some
specialized military assistance, training and cooperation, especially with
the PLO. Yet Cuba's priorities now are to obtain investments, economic
cooperation, and trade opportunities from Iran, Algeria, Lebanon, Turkey,
Egypt, Iraq, and others.
For U.S. interests, the closeness of the relationship with Iraq and some of
the more militant terrorist groups in the Middle East is troublesome. Can
Cuba be used to carry out terrorist acts against U.S. targets? Is there any
cooperation between Sadam Hussein and Castro in the development of chemical
and bacteriological weapons? What remains from the close cooperation between
Castro and the more militant terrorist groups in the region? These and other
questions are of critical importance to the security of the United States.
Cuba's proximity to the U.S., the continuous flow of immigrants from the
island and the increased travel from and to Cuba should make Castro's
relationships a troublesome and worrysome issue to U.S. policymakers.
The Middle East and North Africa have been extremely important to Castro's
foreign policy since 1959. It remains today as a region of special priority
in Castro's redesign of his foreign policy after the collapse of Cuba's
alliance with the former Soviet Union. Actually, there is not one single
aspect of Castro's foreign policy in which the Middle East does not become
important as:
1) A region connected to Cuba's non-aligned interests and policies.
2) An area where Cuba laid the foundations for the deployment of regular
military forces and the establishment of military cooperation over the last
40 years.
3) A region from where to gain knowledge/connections/influence with
"liberation movements" throughout Africa and the Middle East.
4) A base for triangular operations in connection with
Intelligence/subversive activities in Latin America.
5) A source of influence with Arab communities in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
6) A region in which trade, loans, cooperation, and diplomatic support has
become very important, especially in the 1990's.
7) After Vietnam, a virtual laboratory, in the military field, in particular
since the Six Day War (1967), for updating and upgrading Cuba's military
capabilities, including technological and operational capacities.
8) A region where the Arab-Islamic states are extremely important due to
their voting power within the UN system for Cuba's multilateral diplomacy.
It is within such a context that the relevance of the Middle East for Cuba's
foreign policy should be understood. The following chronology is only meant
to be illustrative of the depth and closesness of Cuba’s
long-standing relationships with states, leaders, and groups in this
troubled region.
CHRONOLOGY
1959-1963
* Relations developed with Gamal Abdel Nasser; Cuba joined the Non-Aligned
Movement, sponsored by India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt. Efforts to buy weapons
from Egypt failed.
* The Cuban government sent Captain José Ramón Fernández (currently
vicepresident of the Cuban government) to Israel in the summer of 1959 to
negotiate the purchase of light weaponry and artillery, but no agreement was
reached. Instead, significant civilian assistance was granted by Israel to
Cuba for more than 10 years in the field of citrus cultivation and
diplomatic relations were normal until 1973.
* Raúl Castro and Che Guevara visited Cairo and established contacts with
African liberation movements stationed in and supported by Cairo. Both Cuban
leaders visited Gaza and expressed support for the Palestinian cause.
* Initial relations established with Baghdad under Karim Kassem. The Cuban
government sent Commander William Galvez to purchase light weaponry, tanks
and artillery. No agreement was reached.
* Castro established relations with the Algerian FLN through Paris and
Rabat; official and public support was extended, large quantities of weapons
were shipped to the FLN through Morocco (1960-1961); provided shelter,
medical and educational services were provided in Cuba for wounded
Algerians; political and military cooperation in the fields of
counter-intelligence and intelligence were initiated. First Cuban deployment
of regular military forces in support of the Algerian government against the
Moroccan aggression of 1963. These forces remain to train the Algerian army
for more than a year.
1964-1967
* With considerable hesitation and reluctance, Nasser cooperated with Che
Guevara during his guerrilla operation in Congo-Kinshasa (former Zaire) in
1965.
* Cuba welcomed the founding of the PLO. First contacts with Palestinian
FATAH between 1965 (Algiers) and 1966-67 (Damascus).
* The Tricontinental Conference was held in Havana in January, 1966 to adopt
a common political strategy against colonialism, neocolonialism, and
imperialism.
* Cuba sent weapons via Cairo, to the NLF in Southern Yemen. Cuban agents
were sent on fact-finding missions to North and South Yemen (1967- 1968);
* Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials privately criticized in very harsh
terms the shameful performance of the Egyptian leadership during the Six Day
War in 1967. The war, as such, was thoroughly studied by the Cuban Armed
Forces;
* Cuba and Syria developed a close alliance and supported FATAH and the
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).
1968-1975
* Cuba continued its military and political support for FATAH after the
Syrians broke with the latter, and, later on, Cuban support was granted to
other Palestinian organizations (Popular and Democratic fronts).
* Cuba sent military instructors and advisors into Palestinian bases in
Jordan to train Palestinian fedayeen (1968); first high-level delegation
from FATAH-PLO visited Cuba (1970).
* Several missions sent to Southern Yemen to support NLF / FATAH Ismail
internally and externally, both politically and militarily.
* The Soviet Union and Cuba increased military and civilian cooperation with
Southern Yemen (PDRY).
* Cuba commenced political and military cooperation with Somalia's Siad
Barre (1969).
* Economic cooperation began with Libya in 1974, after serious bilateral
tensions between 1969 and 1973.
* Closer connections with FATAH-PLO and other Palestinian organizations were
reinforced, including training of Latin American guerrillas in Lebanon;
military support included counter-intelligence and intelligence training.
* Arafat visited Cuba in 1974.
* Arab and Non-Aligned countries pressured Cuba to break relations with
Israel in 1973 and sponsor U.N. Resolution on Zionism "as a form of
racial discrimination."
* Cuba provided military support and personnel to Syria during the Yom
Kippur War (1973-1975).
* Cuba joined with Algeria and Libya on a diplomatic/political offensive in
support of Frente POLISARIO (People's Front for the Liberation of Western
Sahara and RÃo del Oro); later on provided military cooperation , medical
services, and other forms of assistance.
1976-1982
* Cuba avoided any public condemnation of Syria's military intervention in
Lebanon, although privately they did so in strong terms.
* Cuba supported the so-called "Steadfastness Front" against the
U.S. backed Camp David accord.
* Additional military and political support provided to the Palestinian
cause; Arafat attended the 6th Non-Aligned Conference in Havana (1979).
* At this stage, significant hard currency loans (tens of million) had been
facilitated by Arafat-PLO to the Cuban government under very soft terms;
Cuba granted diplomatic and political support to Arafat during the 1982
Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In the 1980s, Cuban universities were
graduating hundreds of Palestinian students in various fields, especially
from medical schools.
* The Aden (South Yemen) regime decided to support the Ethiopian radical
officers commanded by Mengistu Haile Mariam, sending Yemeni military units
in support of the latter against Somali aggression, and asking the Cubans to
do the same. Cuba joined in, first with a group of officers headed by
General Arnaldo Ochoa, a move that was followed later on by the deployment
of large Cuban forces against the Somali invasion. Also as part of the
alliance with the Aden regime, Cuba granted some small-scale support to the
Dhofaris in their armed struggle against the monarchy in Oman until the late
1970s.
* As part of Cuba's alliance with Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime in
Ethiopia, the Cuban leadership decided to engage in active political and
military support for more than 10 years to the Liberation Movement of
Southern Sudan headed by John Garang against the Arab-Muslim regime in
Khartoum (until today there are no diplomatic relations between Khartoum and
Havana).
* Cuba developed closer ties with Iraq in various areas (medical services,
construction projects, grants and loans).
* Cuban military advisory to Iraq in different fields began in the mid 1970s
(it was cancelled after the Iraq invasion of Iran in late 1980).
* Cuba cooperated with Libya in the political founding of the World MATHABA
in Tripoli, to provide political support and coordinate revolutionary
movements throughout the world. Cuba supported also Lybia's stand on Chad
and in its support to the FRENTE POLISARIO.
* Despite its close links with Baghdad, Cuba recognized and praised the
Iranian Revolution, although with no significant increase in bilateral ties.
Once Iraq attacked Iran, Cuba withdrew its military advisors from Baghdad
and adopted a position of official impartiality, though more sympathetic to
Baghdad, due to its past relations.
* Castro granted political recognition to the revolution in Afghanistan in
1978, but internecine conflict and civil war prevented any strengthening of
bilateral relations. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 disrupted
Cuba's Non-Aligned policies at a time when Castro was chairman of the NL
Movement. While publicly supporting Moscow, Fidel Castro was very critical
of the Soviet invasion, something that was bitterly discussed with Soviet
officials.
1983-1991
* Declining economic cooperation between Cuba and Libya.
* New ties of alliance between Algeria and Libya with Morocco cut-off any
further direct support from Cuba to FPOLISARIO.
* Libyan support to Latin American revolutionary movements, especially in
Central America and the whole of the World MATHABA project, declined rapidly
after the U.S.bombing of Tripoli in 1986; Cubans increasingly distant until
MATHABA's last meeting in 1990 in Tripoli, where the termination of the
Libyan project was pretty obvious for all the participants, including the
Cuban delegation.
* The Palestinian Intifada increases Cuba’s support for Arafat and
the PLO, both diplomatic and military.
* Cuba starts exploring other possibilities for increased diplomatic
recognition and economic ties in the region, including Saudi Arabia (two
Cuban ambassadors were sent for that purpose, but with no significant
success); the Gulf States, Jordan, Turkey (with much better results:
embassies were finally established in Kuwait, Turkey, Qatar, and Jordan);
and even Israel (with no official success, but with promising inroads within
the private sector and some political/religious forces).
* After the violent collapse of the Aden regime, the death of Fatah Ismail,
andthe reunification with North Yemen, Cuban authorities negotiated with the
government of Sanaa from which bilateral relations continued to develop,
including areas of economic and political cooperation.
* After the negotiations leading to the establishment of the Palestinian
National Authority, Cuban-Palestinian military cooperation was enhanced,
including the areas of counter-intelligence and intelligence.
* Cuba condemned Iraq for its invasion and annexation of Kuwait, supporting
the latter's sovereignty; it also condemned U.S. military operations in the
Gulf and abstained from supporting the bulk of the sanctions imposed on
Baghdad. A Cuban military delegation was sent to Iraq to learn and share
what was considered vital information and experiences from U.S. combat
operations in Kuwait and Iraq.
1992-1999
* Embassies were opened in Qatar, Turkey, Tunisia and Jordan; trade and
joint ventures were developed. Diplomatic ties and trade relationships have
increased discreetly with Egypt and Libya; Qatar supported Cuba in the 1999
sessions on Human Rights at Geneva.
* A high-level PLO military delegation including the new head of
Intelligence paid a non-public visit to Cuba.
* Israeli firms provided capital, technology and markets to Cuba in the
field of citrus cultivation and exports; religious and political delegations
visited were exchanged..
* Lebanon's normalization in the 1990's allowed Cuba to reach important
financial and trade agreements, including Lebanese participation in joint
ventures and in establishing a branch of the Fransabank in Havana. Nabih
Berri, in 1998, the Chairman of the Lebanese parliament paid a long and
successful, visit to Cuba during the month of Ramadan, and more recently
Adnan Kassar, president of the Fransabank and the International Chamber of
Commerce paid an official visit to Havana.
* Iranian-Cuban relations have increased after several high-ranking
delegations from Iran visited Cuba: the Vice-President, the Minister of
Foreign Relations, the Minister of Public Health, and the Minister of Social
Assistance. The Cuban Minister of Public Health visited Iran in 1998. In the
last two years the number of Cuban doctors, paramedics, and medical services
hired by Teheran have increased, together with additional purchases of Cuban
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology products. A recent agreement (1999) was
signed, establishing Cuba's assistance in setting up social security/social
assistance networks in Iran.
* The recent election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika (April 1999) as President of
Algeria, opens new opportunities for Cuba, given Bouteflika's close
relationship with the Cuban government for more than 40 years.
* PLO leaders continue to have close relations with the Cuban leadership,
having access to specialized military and intelligence training, either in
Cuba or Palestinian territory, and in the sharing of intelligence.
* Cuba continues to actively undermine U.S. policies in the Middle East and
North Africa in primarily three ways: a) Portraying U.S. actions and
diplomacy in the region as those of an aggressor, seeking to impose hegemony
by force such as the recurrent attacks on Iraq, violation of sovereign
rights (no-fly zones), the perpetuation of unjustified economic sanctions to
countries in the region (Iraq, Iran, Syria), open political intervention and
the use of brutal force as acts of retaliation (the Bin Laden
case/Yugoslavia); b) portraying the U.S. as the main obstacle to a peaceful
settlement of the Israel/Palestine and the Gulf conflicts, and c)
discrediting U.S. policies, especially by gaining support for Cuba's agenda
at the U.N. These Anti-American views and policies are conveyed as a
systematic message through a network of Cuban embassies in most countries of
the region, at the U.N. and its multilateral system plus Cuban embassies and
missions throughout the Western Hemisphere and other significant
non-governmental political and cultural channels.
GLOSSARY
1. FLN. Front de Libération National, the political and military
organization that led the war of national liberation against French colonial
rule between 1954 and 1962. Ruling political party until the 1980s in
Algeria.
2. PLO. Palestine Liberation Organization, founded in Cairo, in 1964, under
the auspices of Egypt (then known as the United Arab Republic) to serve
Nasser's manipulations of the Palestinian cause, composed mostly of
conservative Palestinian intellectuals and bureaucrats serving Arab
governments. An instrument of Nasser's foreign policy until the June War of
1967, when the old PLO leadership collapsed to be replaced by FATEH's
leadership headed by Arafat.
3. FATEH. Acronym for Palestine National Liberation Movement, founded in
1959 by younger generations of Palestinians that had experienced the defeats
of 1948 and 1956, strongly committed to a radical nationalist platform to
fight for Palestine and against Arab intervention and manipulations of the
Palestinian problem. Mostly an underground and not legally recognized
organization until the June War in 1967; it transformed itself into the most
powerful and influential party inside Palestinian and Arab politics,
controlling the PLO effectively since 1969, when Arafat becomes its
chairman.
4. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The most important branch
of the Arab Nationalist Movement (known as the ANM, created in the 1950s as
radical followers of Nasser). After the June War of 1967 splitting away from
Nasser and focusing on building a more radical alternative within the
Palestinians under the name of Popular Front, led by George Habash; a later
off-spring, in 1969, was the Democratic Front led by Nayef Hawatmeh.
Strongly based in Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, and the Gulf, until 1970 heavily
engaged in terrorist methods. After 1970 dropped such tactics, became more
active and open across the occupied territories and southern Lebanon,
adopting Marxist-Leninist ideology.
5. Frente POLISARIO. Frente Popular de Liberación del SagÃa el Hamra y
RÃo del Oro, inspired by the ANM tradition and the Algerian FLN, created
to fight against the Spanish-Morrocan-Mauritinian arrangements to split the
former colony of SaguÃa el Hamra/RÃo del Oro (known as Western Sahara)
between the two African states. Enjoyed active support from Algeria and
Libya together with a considerable number of African states until the 1980s.
6. NFL. National Front for the Liberation of South Yemen, another important,
and successful, branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement. Created in 1962 in
the course of the revolution in North Yemen, against the monarchy and
supported by Nasser. Expanded to the south of Yemen and began armed struggle
against British colonial occupation and local feudal lords (sultans and
sheikhs). Broke with Nasser in 1966-1967 and finally forced the British to
negotiate and evacuate Aden, followed by the defeat of the local feudal
lords. Since 1965 it has had very close relations with Cuba. Main leader was
Abdel Fatah Ismail. Internecine conflicts sine the late 1970s eventually led
to open civil war in 1990 and the collapse of the regime, the death of Fatah
Ismail, and integration with the north under the control of the government
in Sanaa.
7. World MATHABA. A Libyan project from the late 1970s to promote political,
financial, and military support for revolutionary movements throughout the
world. Ghaddafi called on other "revolutionary governments" to
support this project, which Cuba did although with extreme caution and
distrust. Cuba could not refuse to join due to the fact that its major
allies in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and even the Soviet Union
had accepted to participate and that many of them were benefitting from
Libya's abundant financial support. Although governments -like the case of
Cuba- took part at the level of political deliberations and to coordinate
common actions in the diplomatic and political fields, MATHABA was something
else: essentially a tool in the hands of the Libyans to project their
individual goals and agenda (Ghaddafi's Green Book, to reward his
supporters, and to undermine his enemies). Financial and military assistance
was never a collective decision, but responded for the most part to
bilateral arrangements between Ghaddafi's regime and individual
organizations, some of which resorted, at different stages, to terrorist
methods like the IRA and ETA. Insurgencies in Central America, like the
Sandinistas and others, were privileged beneficiaries along with the African
National Congress, FRENTE POLISARIO, and others. Cuban leaders were always
anxious to counterbalance Libyan attempts for unilateral actions, to
influence Cuban allies or about Ghaddafi's hostility toward well-known Cuban
allies such as Arafat. The dominant perception among Cuban leaders was that
Ghaddafi posed too many unnecessary security risks the U.S. and too many
complications within Cuban alliances.
8. People's Liberation Movement of Southern Sudan. The final outcome of
different secessionist movements in southern Sudan during the 1960s and
early 1970s (like the Anya-Nyas) fighting against Arab-Islamic control of
the central government, allocation of resources, and religious, political,
and ethnic intolerance.
9. Eritrean Liberation Front. The most influential Eritrean organization
fighting for secession from Ethiopia in the 1960s, actively supported by the
Syrian regime since 1965. Various internal divisions developed later on
until the late 1970s, when a new front was built based on very different
domestic and external alliances and, eventually led the Eritreans to
victory. Cuba's support to Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime in 1978 meant the
cessation of previous Cuban backing to the Eritrean cause.
10. PDRY. People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, official name adopted by
the Southern Yemeni independent republic.
11. Gamal Abdel Nasser. A colonel in the Egyptian army, member of the Free
Officers Movement formed after the defeat in 1948 at the hands of the
newly-born state of Israel. Led the revolution that overthrew the monarchy
in 1952. Undertook signficant economic, social, and political
transformations, setting much of the basic tenets and role-model of Arab
nationalsm after WWII. Co-founder of the Neutralist countries in 1956 and of
the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Defeated by Israel in 1948, 1956, and
1967.
12. Karim Kassem. A colonel in the Iraqi army and, at the beginning, a
follower of Nasser. Led the revolution against the monarchy in 1958. A rival
of Nasser later on, a bloody military coup inspired and mostly led by the
Arab BAATH party, a strong and influential inter-Arab nationalist movement
in the Middle East, overthrew him in 1963.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CUBA'S POLICIES AND ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA
1. Anderson, Jon Lee (1997). Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life, New York,
Grove Press.
2. Baez, Luis (1996). Secreto de Generales, Ciudad de La Habana, Ediciones
SI-MAR, S.A.
3. B'nai B'rith (1982). "PLO Activities in Latin America," New
York, Anti-Defamation League.
4. Campbell, John C. "Soviet Policy in the Middle East." Current
History Num.80 (January 1981).
5. Durch, William J. ""The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle
East: From Algeria to Angola."
Studies in Comparative Communism, Num. XI (Spring-Summer 1978).
6. The Economist Foreign Report. "Castro's First Middle East Adventure:
Part II."15 March, 1978.
7. Erisman, Michael H. (1985). Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy
of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy,Boulder, Westview.
8. Eran, Oded. "Soviet Middle East Policy: 1967-1973,"Rabinovich,
Itamar and Haim Shaked, eds. (1978). From June to October: The Middle East
Between 1967 and 1973, New Brunswick, Transaction Books.
9. Falk, Pamela S. (1986). Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest,
Massanchussets/Toronto,
D.C. Heath and Company.
10. Fernández, Damián (1988). Cuba's Foreign Policy in the Middle
East, Boulder, Westview Press. 11. Karol, K.S. (1971). Guerrillas in Power,
London, Jonathan Cape.
12. Legum, Colim and Haim Shaked, eds. (1977-1980). The Middle East
Contemporary Survey. Vols. IIII, New York, Holmes and Meir.
13. "Relations Between the palestinian Terrorists and Cuba."
Reprinted from Lebanon: Selected Documents. Israeli, Raphael, ed.,
London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983.
14. Siljander, Mark. "The Palestine Liberation Organization in Central
America."Mmeo., October 1983.
15. U.S. Department of State. "The Sandinistas and the Middle Eastern
Radicals."Washington D.C., August 1985.
16. Viotti, Paul R. "Politics in the Yemens and the Horn of Africa:
Constraints on a Super Power."Mark V. Kauppi and R. craig Nations, eds.
The Soviet Union and the Middle east in the 1980s. Lexington, D.C. Heath,
1983.
[1] Mr. Amuchastegui is a research associate at the Institute for Cuban
and Cuban-American Studies and a Doctoral candidate at the School of
International Studies, University of Miami. He was a professor at the Higher
Institute of International Relations in Havana; Guest Professor at the Cuban
National Defense College; Senior Researcher at Cuba's Center for Studies of
Africa and the Middle East; and Intelligence Analyst and Head of the
Organization Department at the Tricontinental Organization in the 1960s and
1970s. He traveled extensively through North Africa and the Middle East. He
edited Palestine: Crisis and Revolution (Havana, 1970); Palestine:
Dimensions of a Conflict Sociology and Politics in Israel Contemporary
History of Asia and Africa (Four Volumes, Havana, 1984-1988), together with
several other books and articles. He was a direct or indirect participant in
most of the developments described herein until 1993.
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